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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioners, four children of Salvadoran and Honduran 
origin and their mothers, appear before us for a second time to 
challenge their expedited orders of removal.  In Castro v. 
United States Department of Homeland Security, 835 F.3d 422 
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(3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017), we held 
that we lacked jurisdiction to review their claims under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and that, while the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution would allow an 
aggrieved party with sufficient ties to the United States to 
challenge that lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ ties were 
inadequate because their relationship to the United States 
amounted only to presence in the country for a few hours 
before their apprehension by immigration officers.  Thus, we 
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of their petition. 
 
Now, two years after their initial detention, Petitioners 
raise what, at first glance, appear to be the same claims.  But 
upon inspection they differ in a critical respect: The children 
now have been accorded Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) 
status—a protective classification designed by Congress to 
safeguard abused, abandoned, or neglected alien children who 
are able to meet its rigorous eligibility requirements.  The 
protections afforded to children with SIJ status include an array 
of statutory and regulatory rights and safeguards, such as 
eligibility for application of adjustment of status to that of 
lawful permanent residents (LPR), exemption from various 
grounds of inadmissibility, and robust procedural protections 
to ensure their status is not revoked without good cause.   
 
Because we conclude that the INA prohibits our review 
just as it did in Castro, we are now confronted with a matter of 
first impression among the Courts of Appeals: Does the 
jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA operate as an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as 
applied to SIJ designees seeking judicial review of orders of 
expedited removal?  We conclude that it does.  As we 
explained in Castro, only aliens who have developed sufficient 
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connections to this country may invoke our Constitution’s 
protections.  By virtue of satisfying the eligibility criteria for 
SIJ status and being accorded by Congress the statutory and 
due process rights that derive from it, Petitioners here, unlike 
the petitioners in Castro, meet that standard and therefore may 
enforce their rights under the Suspension Clause.  Accordingly, 
we will reverse the District Court’s denial of Petitioners’ 
request for injunctive relief.1 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
The eight Petitioners—Wendy Amparo Osorio-
Martinez and her three-year-old child D.S. R.-O., Carmen 
Aleyda Lobo Mejia and her four-year-old child A.D. M.-L., 
Maria Delmi Martinez Nolasco and her seven-year-old child 
J.E. L.-M., and Jethzabel Maritza Aguilar Mancia and her 
sixteen-year-old child V.G. R.-A.—fled physical and sexual 
violence perpetrated by gangs in their home countries of 
Honduras and El Salvador.  In September and October of 2015, 
each family crossed into the United States from Mexico and 
was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol within four 
miles of the border almost immediately thereafter.  They were 
initially detained in Texas and later moved to a detention center 
in Leesport, Pennsylvania.  After immigration officers 
determined that Petitioners were inadmissible, they were each 
ordered expeditiously removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).  
The families requested asylum due to their fear of gang-based 
                                              
1  Although Petitioners include both the children and 
their mothers, all the claims asserted pertain exclusively to the 
children.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11(c)(1).  As a result, our analysis relates only to the 
children’s right to relief.   
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violence in their home countries, but their asylum requests 
were denied by a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Asylum Officer and affirmed by an Immigration Judge (IJ).2 
 
 In late 2015, all eight Petitioners, along with twenty-
five additional families being held at the detention center, 
sought habeas relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
challenging their final expedited removal orders and the 
procedures underlying those orders.  See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 163 F. Supp. 3d 157 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  In that 
case, the families claimed that the Asylum Officers and IJs 
violated their constitutional and statutory rights in the manner 
that they conducted the “credible fear” interviews.  See id. at 
158.  The District Court dismissed their claims, id. at 175, and 
when they appealed we did not reach the merits because we 
affirmed the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  Castro, 835 F.3d at 425.       
 
 The key questions in Castro were whether the INA, 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), stripped us of jurisdiction to review the 
petitioners’ claims, and if so, whether such jurisdiction-
stripping violated the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.  
                                              
2 It appears that their asylum requests were denied at the 
“credible fear” screening stage based on their inability to 
demonstrate a nexus between their persecution and their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion as required for asylum eligibility, and not 
a negative credibility finding as to their stated fear of physical 
and sexual violence.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13; 8 U.S.C. § 1158; see 
also Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 128-29 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
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We concluded we did lack jurisdiction under the INA, 
explaining that, under § 1252(e)(2)(B), we were only permitted 
to review “whether an immigration officer issued that piece of 
paper [i.e., the expedited removal order] and whether the 
Petitioner is the same person referred to in that order.”  Castro, 
835 F.3d at 431, 434 (citations omitted).  We also concluded 
that “Petitioners [were] unable to invoke the Suspension 
Clause” because, “as recent surreptitious entrants deemed to be 
‘alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United States,’” they 
lacked any constitutional rights regarding their applications for 
admission.  Id. at 448-49 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 
U.S. 21, 32 (1982)).   
 
 That may have seemed the end of the road for the Castro 
petitioners.  While the Castro litigation was pending, however, 
the four children here applied for SIJ status.  To do so, they 
first sought and obtained orders from the Berks County Court 
of Common Pleas “finding that reunification with one or both 
the parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or 
abandonment, and that it would not be in the child’s best 
interest to be returned to his or her country of origin.”  App. 7-
8.  Based on those orders, the children submitted petitions for 
SIJ status to the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS).  In late 2016, USCIS approved their 
petitions and, with the consent of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the children were formally granted SIJ status. 
 
 Among other benefits, SIJ status conferred on the 
children eligibility and the right to apply for adjustment of 
status to that of lawful permanent residents while within the 
United States.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (h)(1).  At the time they 
filed those applications, however, visas necessary for their 
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adjustment of status had not yet come available.3  Thus, for 
close to two years, the children have been wait-listed, retaining 
their SIJ classification and awaiting adjustment of their status 
to LPR.  Notwithstanding these developments, however, DHS 
continued to detain the children and their mothers and to seek 
their expedited removal—removal to the very countries to 
which USCIS and the Berks County Court of Common Pleas 
both found, as part of the SIJ determination, it would not be in 
the children’s best interest to return.  The Government’s 
decision to continue seeking removal is particularly 
noteworthy because, as far as we are aware, until very recently 
DHS has never attempted to remove SIJ-classified children 
back to their countries of origin, much less on an expedited 
basis. 
 
 In view of the children’s changed status, Petitioners 
filed a new class action complaint seeking a writ of habeas 
corpus or injunction to prevent the Government from executing 
the expedited removal orders against them and to require their 
release from immigration detention pursuant to those orders, 
on the ground that their SIJ classification prohibited their 
expedited removal and continued detention.  Petitioners also 
sought a declaration that their expedited removal violates due 
process, and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining 
order.  In so doing, Petitioners claimed that their expedited 
removal violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
                                              
3 Congress has set various limits on the number of visas 
that may be made available, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153, 
resulting in a waiting list when demand for visas exceeds 
supply, see 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1).  The Government 
represents that the current waiting list for these SIJ designees 
is backed up more than two years. 
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of the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
and its implementing regulations, the Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act (which implements the Convention 
Against Torture), and the Administrative Procedure Act.  They 
also asserted a Bivens action on the ground that their continued 
detention violated their Fifth Amendment right not to be 
illegally detained.4   
 
The District Court initially granted Petitioners’ request 
for a temporary restraining order.  But the case was then 
reassigned to a different judge who dissolved the TRO and 
declined to issue a preliminary injunction, interpreting Castro 
to mean that Petitioners could not succeed on the merits of their 
claims because the District Court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, enjoin Petitioners’ 
removal, or place them in standard removal proceedings.  This 
appeal followed.5 
                                              
4 A Bivens action refers to “a private right of action for 
damages . . . brought directly under the Constitution against 
federal officials.”  Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 
198 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 
248-49 (1979) (recognizing Bivens actions under the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause).  
 
5 In September 2017, after the District Court dissolved 
the TRO and the parties completed briefing the case before us, 
Petitioners were released from the detention center.  Over the 
Government’s objection, IJs held bond hearings for Petitioners 
and determined that they should be released on “conditional 
parole” under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B), finding that it was 
“simply inconceivable,” Petitioners’ 28(j) Letter 1 (Sept. 14, 
2017), that Petitioners had been imprisoned for almost two 
10 
 
II. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction 
“In reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary 
injunction, we employ a tripartite standard of review: findings 
of fact are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo, and the decision to grant or deny an 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  Del. Strong 
Families v. Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 We “have jurisdiction to determine whether we have 
jurisdiction,” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2007), and the central question in this case is whether 
the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over Petitioners’ 
claims either under the INA or through invocation of the 
Suspension Clause.6  We address these issues in turn. 
                                              
years on a record “completely devoid of any reason, rational or 
otherwise,” justifying their continued detention, see id. at 11, 
25, 38, 47 (IJs’ Bond Memoranda).  The Government appealed, 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a stay.  As 
of the date this case was argued, however, Petitioners had not 
been taken back into custody. 
 
6 Petitioners’ release from physical detention prior to 
oral argument in this matter does not affect our jurisdiction 
because, although habeas relief is limited to those “in custody,” 
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), the “in custody” inquiry is made “at the 
time the petition was filed,” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 
(1998), and, in any event, the limitation “has not required that 
a prisoner be physically confined” so long as the release is “not 
unconditional,” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989).  
Petitioners’ release also does not moot their claim because they 
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III. Discussion 
The Government asserts that, for all intents and 
purposes, this case is identical to Castro and our holding there 
dictates the same outcome here.  As we explain below, while 
we agree with the Government that Castro forecloses our 
jurisdiction under § 1252(e)(2), we conclude that Castro 
supports a different result as to the constitutionality of that 
jurisdiction-stripping provision as applied to SIJ designees.7  
                                              
can still point to “an actual injury traceable to the defendant[s] 
and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision,” 
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), namely, 
vacating the expedited orders of removal, see Chong v. Dist. 
Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 385 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
deportation did not moot an alien’s habeas petition); Kamara 
v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 215 n.11 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 
that “vacat[ing] the order of removal” may be an appropriate 
remedy for a habeas petition); Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 
292, 297 (5th Cir. 2004) (granting writ and vacating 
deportation order because “an appropriate remedy is to vacate 
or modify the underlying illegal judgment”).  Indeed, we have 
held that an “order of removal creates sufficient collateral 
consequences to render [an alien’s] petition a live case or 
controversy by preventing her from entering the United States” 
for a fixed period of time in the future, Chong, 264 F.3d at 385, 
and here, if removed pursuant to expedited removal orders, 
Petitioners would be inadmissible for at least five years, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). 
 
7 While the Government asserts that SIJ classification 
“does not itself alter Appellants’ legal status,” Gov’t Br. 6, this 
argument is belied by the text of the INA, which explicitly 
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We will address, first, the question of our jurisdiction under the 
INA; second, the constitutionality of § 1252(e)(2) under the 
Suspension Clause as applied to Petitioners; and third, the 
consequences of our analysis for Petitioners’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
A. Statutory Basis for Jurisdiction 
Petitioners’ challenge arises at the conflux of two 
provisions of the INA.  On the one hand, as we explained in 
detail in Castro, Congress prescribed expedited removal 
procedures to facilitate the speedy processing of certain 
inadmissible aliens, limiting their access to federal courts 
under § 1252(e)(2) and granting immigration officers virtually 
unchecked authority to effect their removal.  835 F.3d at 425-
27.  On the other hand, as Petitioners argue, for certain aliens 
present in the country, including SIJ designees, Congress has 
provided for special immigrant classifications, affording them 
a status and statutory protections that may not be revoked 
without specified process, including judicial review.  See, e.g., 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(27)(J) as modified by Pub. L. No. 110-457, 
§ 235, 112 Stat. 5044 (Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008), 1255(h); 8 C.F.R. § 205.2.  
Because the children have now attained this status, they 
contend they are exempted from the application of 
§ 1252(e)(2) and the courts retain statutory jurisdiction to 
                                              
designates SIJ as a “status” that affords its designees a host of 
legal rights and protections.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) 
(describing SIJ as a “status”); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b) (same); 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(h) (listing rights); see also Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing SIJ as 
a “special status to remain in the United States”). 
13 
 
review their expedited removal orders.  We briefly review the 
provisions of the INA relevant to expedited removal and to SIJ 
status before explaining why Castro definitively resolved this 
issue in the Government’s favor. 
i. Expedited Removal of Inadmissible 
Aliens 
As a general matter, when an immigration officer 
determines that an alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt 
entitled to be admitted” to the United States, the INA requires 
that the alien be placed in standard removal proceedings.  8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id. § 1229a (standard removal 
proceedings).  Those proceedings take place before an IJ and 
provide the alien with a variety of procedural protections, 
including the rights to present evidence, examine the evidence 
against him, demand reconsideration or reopening of his case, 
and appeal adverse decisions.  Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B), (c)(5), 
(c)(6), (c)(7); see also Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 
208, 211 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A]liens in immigration proceedings 
. . . are entitled to due process of law.”). 
 
However, Congress has also provided for a separate 
form of removal, known as “expedited removal,” which 
permits the accelerated removal of aliens who, according to 
immigration officers, meet a set of statutorily determined 
criteria.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).  Those requirements include: 
(1) that the alien be “arriving in the United States” or not have 
been continuously present in the United States for two years; 
(2) that the alien has “not been admitted or paroled” into the 
United States; and (3) that the alien either lack valid 
immigration documentation or have made a misrepresentation 
in an attempt to attain immigration status.  Id.  Aside from an 
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asylum interview, such aliens are afforded no procedural 
protections, let alone the various procedural safeguards of 
standard removal proceedings.  See id. 
 
As relevant to Petitioners’ claims, expedited removal 
also affects aliens in two other respects.  First, the INA tightly 
constrains judicial review of expedited removal orders, 
stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to review such orders 
except on three narrow grounds: (1) whether the petitioner is 
an alien; (2) whether the petitioner was “ordered removed” 
under the expedited removal provisions; and (3) whether the 
petitioner can prove that she has been granted legal permanent 
resident, refugee, or asylum status.  Id. § 1252(e)(2).  
Underscoring the limited scope of the second ground, the 
statute specifies that the inquiry into whether a petitioner was 
“ordered removed” may address only “whether such an order 
in fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner.”  Id. 
§ 1252(e)(5).  It also bars review of any claim “arising from or 
relating to the implementation or operation of an order of 
removal pursuant to [the expedited removal provision].”  Id. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 
Second, expedited removal significantly restricts an 
alien’s eligibility for future admission to the United States, as 
“[a]ny alien who has been ordered removed under [the 
expedited removal provisions] . . . and who again seeks 
admission within 5 years of the date of such removal . . . is 
inadmissible.”  Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).  And if that alien 
reenters the United States without being admitted, he or she is 
then inadmissible for 10 years.  Id. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), (ii). 
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ii. Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Classification 
Congress established SIJ status in 1990 in order to 
“protect abused, neglected or abandoned children who, with 
their families, illegally entered the United States,” Yeboah v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J), and it entrusted the review of SIJ 
petitions to USCIS, a component of DHS.  6 USCIS Policy 
Manual, pt. J, ch. 1 (Mar. 21, 2018).     
 
Alien children may receive SIJ status only after 
satisfying a set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility 
criteria, including that a juvenile court find it would not be in 
the child’s best interest to return to her country of last habitual 
residence and that the child is dependent on the court or placed 
in the custody of the state or someone appointed by the state.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c).  The child 
must also receive approval from USCIS and the consent of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to obtain the status.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J); Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting 
Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations & Pearl Chang, Acting 
Chief, Office of Policy & Strategy, USCIS, Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status Provisions 3 (Mar. 24, 2009), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memor
anda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf 
[hereinafter USCIS Memorandum] (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-
405, at 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.)).   
 
Once attained, SIJ classification conveys a host of 
important benefits.  For purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which 
describes adjustment of status, SIJ designees are “deemed . . . 
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to have been paroled into the United States.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(h)(1).  Moreover, the INA automatically exempts SIJ 
designees from a set of generally applicable grounds of 
inadmissibility and provides that other grounds of 
inadmissibility also may be waived at the Attorney General’s 
discretion.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(h)(2), 1182(a).  Of particular 
note, the INA exempts SIJ designees from inadmissibility 
based on the lack of “valid entry document[s],” id. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)—the very ground on which the 
Government alleges Petitioners are eligible for expedited 
removal.  App. 437 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)).  
Additionally, Congress has granted SIJ designees various 
forms of support within the United States, such as access to 
federally funded educational programming and preferential 
status when seeking employment-based visas.  See id. 
§§ 1232(d)(4)(A), 1153(b)(4). 
 
Finally, SIJ status, once granted, may not be revoked 
except “on notice,” 8 C.F.R. § 205.2, and upon the 
Government’s compliance with a series of procedural 
safeguards: The Secretary of Homeland Security must find 
“good and sufficient cause” for revocation; the agency must 
provide notice of intent to revoke; and the SIJ designee must 
be given the opportunity to present evidence opposing 
revocation.  8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2; see also 7 
USCIS Policy Manual, pt. F, ch. 7 (Mar. 21, 2018). 
 
The SIJ designee also has the right to appeal any adverse 
ruling, initially to the Associate Commissioner for 
Examinations, 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d), and then to the extent the 
child claims he or she “suffer[ed] legal wrong because of 
agency action,” to the federal courts.  5 U.S.C. § 702; Yeboah, 
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345 F.3d at 220-21; M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109, 111-14 
(3d Cir. 2002).8 
 
iii. Statutory Jurisdiction over Petitioners’ 
Claims 
 Petitioners argue that their SIJ status qualifies them for 
the second exception to § 1252(e)(2)’s general bar on judicial 
review: review of whether the alien was “ordered removed” 
under the expedited removal provisions.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(e)(2)(B).  That is, expedited removal only applies to 
“aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens 
who have been admitted or paroled,” id. § 1225(b)(1), but once 
Petitioners acquired SIJ status, they were “deemed . . . to have 
been paroled into the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1).  
                                              
8 As our cases make clear, while discretionary decisions 
of the Attorney General are not subject to judicial review, 
federal courts may review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, whether the agency has comported with 
its own regulations and policies identifying the factors it must 
consider and the process it must accord.  Compare Quarantillo, 
301 F.3d at 111-14 (judicial review may be permitted where 
“an agency ‘announces and follows—by rule or by settled 
course of adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise 
of discretion will be governed,’” such that there is “some law 
to apply” (quoting INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 
(1996))) with Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 
200 (3d Cir. 2006) (no judicial review for revocation based 
merely on whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has 
found “what he deems to be good and sufficient cause” because 
that determination is entirely committed to agency discretion 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1155)). 
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Therefore, according to Petitioners, their expedited orders of 
removal are unenforceable; they can no longer be considered 
“ordered removed”; and there is no statutory bar under 
§ 1252(e)(2) to judicial review and invalidation of the 
expedited removal orders.   
 
Castro forecloses this line of argument.  There, the 
petitioners likewise argued that we retained jurisdiction to 
review whether they had been “ordered removed” because they 
took issue with the validity of the order—in that case because 
they claimed the asylum officer and the IJ conducted their 
credible fear interviews in a manner that violated their 
constitutional and statutory rights.  Castro, 835 F.3d at 428, 
430.  We held that jurisdiction was precluded by § 1252(e)(5), 
which provides: 
 
In determining whether an alien has been ordered 
removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this title 
[the expedited removal provision], the court’s 
inquiry shall be limited to whether such an order 
in fact was issued and whether it relates to the 
petitioner.  There shall be no review of whether 
the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to 
any relief from removal. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5).  We held that the first sentence “clearly 
evince[s] Congress’ intent to narrowly circumscribe judicial 
review of issues relating to expedited removal orders,” and that 
the second sentence further “clarifies the narrowness of the 
inquiry under the first sentence, i.e., that review should only be 
for whether an immigration officer issued that piece of paper 
and whether the Petitioner is the same person referred to in that 
order.”  Castro, 835 F.3d at 431 (citation omitted).  Yet 
19 
 
Petitioners here, as in Castro, seek review beyond those two 
extraordinarily narrow grounds.  They do not contest that the 
order was issued or that it relates to them; rather, their claim is 
that the order is being illegally applied to them.  No fair reading 
of Castro permits that inquiry. 
 
Moreover, Castro indirectly confronted, and rejected, 
an argument nearly identical to Petitioners’ parole argument 
when it discounted the reasoning of American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650 
(E.D. Mich. 2003).  Castro, 835 F.3d at 432.  Just as Petitioners 
here argue that they are “paroled” and therefore exempted from 
expedited removal by the terms of the statute, the petitioners in 
American-Arab—a group of Lebanese citizens against whom 
expedited removal proceedings had commenced—argued that 
they were not “arriving aliens” and therefore were ineligible 
for expedited removal.  272 F. Supp. 2d at 664.  In that case, 
the court agreed with the petitioners, focusing on the fact that 
§ 1252(e)(5) directs the “ordered removed” inquiry to 
“whether [the order] relates to the petitioner,” and then 
concluding that review of whether the statute was “lawfully 
applied is a review of the question of whether an order of 
expedited removal has been entered against them and whether 
the order ‘relates’ to the individual.”  Id. at 663.  But in Castro 
we found that court’s “construction of the statute to be not just 
unsupported, but also flatly contradicted by the plain language 
of the statute itself.”  835 F.3d at 432.   
 
 In an attempt to distinguish Castro, Petitioners argue 
that they “do not challenge the entry of their expedited removal 
orders,” but rather take issue with “actions by the Government 
after the orders issued,” i.e., whether the Government can 
circumvent the processes required by statute and regulation to 
20 
 
achieve de facto revocation of Petitioners’ SIJ status by 
effectuating their expedited removal.  Pet’r Br. 25.  But § 1252 
not only strips the courts of the ability to review the orders 
themselves, but also to review “any other cause or claim arising 
from or relating to the implementation or operation of” such an 
order.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).  “Relating to” is typically 
construed as having a broad, expansive meaning, including in 
the immigration context.  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of these 
words [‘relating to’] is a broad one.”); Aguilar v. U.S. 
Immigration. & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting that, for purposes of 
a different provision of § 1252, “relating to” could be used to 
mean “to sweep within its scope claims with only a remote or 
attenuated connection” to the underlying removal).  
Furthermore, “arising from or relating to” must be interpreted 
broadly because we are reading the phrase in the context of a 
statutory scheme that is “aimed at protecting the Executive’s 
discretion from the courts.”  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).  With these 
considerations in mind, Petitioners’ claims as to the effect of 
their SIJ status on the enforceability of their expedited orders 
of removal do “arise from” or “relate to” those orders.   
 
In sum, Petitioners seek a judgment holding that the 
orders are unenforceable, but as Castro and the plain language 
of § 1252 make clear, these claims fall within the ambit of the 
jurisdiction-stripping provision. 
 
B. Constitutional Basis for Jurisdiction  
Because we conclude that the INA strips the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to review Petitioners’ challenge to their 
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expedited removal orders, we must confront a second question, 
this one of constitutional dimension: Does the stripping of 
federal court jurisdiction to hear the claims of these children 
violate the Suspension Clause?  In view of their SIJ status and 
the significant connections to the United States that it entails, 
we hold today that it does.9 
 
The Suspension Clause forbids suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 2.  To determine whether a jurisdiction-stripping statute 
violates the Clause, we proceed, as in Castro, through the two-
step analysis that the Supreme Court announced in 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  We first determine 
“whether a given habeas petitioner is prohibited from invoking 
the Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner 
or to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or detention.”  
                                              
9 In a recent concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that 
the Suspension Clause should be unavailable to alien-
petitioners who claimed a right to bail hearings and sought only 
“declaratory and injunctive relief,” but did not invoke § 2254 
or request release from custody.  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. 
Ct. 830, 858 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).  That view has 
not been adopted by a majority of the Court, but even assuming 
it is correct, it would not preclude jurisdiction here because 
Petitioners did seek habeas relief in their initial complaint, and, 
to the extent they request a stay of their expedited removal 
orders, that relief is ancillary to the primary relief they seek: 
release from the detention and from the expedited removal 
authorized by their orders of removal under § 1225(b)(1). 
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Castro, 835 F.3d at 445 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739).10  
Then, if the petitioner is not prohibited from invoking the 
Suspension Clause, we “turn to the question whether the 
substitute for habeas is adequate and effective to test the 
legality of the petitioner’s detention (or removal).”  Id. at 445 
(citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739).  
 
In Castro, we determined that the Suspension Clause 
was not violated where aliens, apprehended within hours of 
                                              
10 At the first step of the inquiry, the Boumediene Court 
considered three sets of factors to determine that detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay may seek the writ: “(1) the citizenship and 
status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through 
which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and 
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s 
entitlement to the writ.”  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.  
Although, following Castro, we do not assess all of these 
factors here, we are confident that they would similarly lead us 
to conclude that Petitioners may invoke the Suspension Clause.  
Like the “status of the detainee[s]” at Guantanamo Bay, 
Petitioners’ “status” as SIJ designees militates against denial 
of the writ.  Id.  As to the second and third factors relevant to 
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause, Petitioners 
were not apprehended or detained outside United States 
territory, see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 
(1950), nor are there serious practical obstacles to permitting 
habeas corpus proceedings besides the kind of “incremental 
expenditure of resources” that the Supreme Court deemed not 
dispositive to the question of granting the writ, Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 769.   
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entering the country, were denied review of their expedited 
removal orders.  Id. at 445-46.  We explained that the 
petitioners there could not overcome the INA’s jurisdiction-
stripping provisions based on “physical presence alone,” id. at 
448, but we explicitly “le[ft] it to courts in the future to 
evaluate the Suspension Clause rights of an alien whose 
presence in the United States goes meaningfully beyond that of 
Petitioners here,” id. at 448 n.30.  Castro anticipated 
circumstances like those with which we are presented today, 
and it foreshadowed the outcome: Because SIJ status reflects 
Petitioners’ significant ties to this country and Congress’s 
determination that such aliens should be accorded important 
statutory and procedural protections, Petitioners are entitled to 
invoke the Suspension Clause and petition the federal courts 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  We further conclude that because 
the expedited removal regime does not provide an adequate 
substitute process, the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions 
effect an unconstitutional suspension of the writ as applied to 
Petitioners.  We address the Boumediene steps in sequence. 
 
i. Boumediene Step One 
We begin, as we did in Castro, by asking whether 
Petitioners are “prohibited from invoking the Suspension 
Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner[s] or to the 
circumstances surrounding [their] arrest or detention.”  Castro, 
835 F.3d at 445 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739).  There, 
we resolved the petitioners’ claims at the first step of the 
Boumediene analysis based on the Supreme Court’s 
“unequivocal[] conclu[sion] that ‘an alien seeking initial 
admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no 
constitutional rights regarding his application.’”  Id. (quoting 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).  Recognizing that “initial admission” 
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in Landon can be read to mean “initial entry,”11 we decided that 
aliens “apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering 
                                              
11  We noted in Castro that “‘initial admission’ in 
Landon may simply be synonymous with ‘initial entry,’” such 
that no meaning can be inferred from the fact that the Court 
“did not categorize aliens based on whether they have entered 
the country or not” but instead did so based “on whether the 
aliens are ‘seeking initial admission to the United States.’”  
Castro, 835 F.3d at 449 n.31 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).  This is clearly the correct reading, 
and not merely because the Landon Court relied on United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), 
a case about entry, for the proposition that an “alien seeking 
initial admission” has no constitutional rights, Landon, 459 
U.S. at 32.  More to the point, Landon was decided in 1982, 
well before Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (IIRIRA), that, for the first time, 
defined admission in terms of “lawful entry.”  That Landon 
intended its pre-IIRIRA references to “admission” as 
references to entry of any kind, lawful or not, is reinforced by 
the direct contrast the Court draws between an alien “seeking 
admission” and an alien “already physically in the United 
States” to explain the distinction between deportation and 
exclusion proceedings.  See Landon, 459 U.S. at 25.  
Unsurprisingly, the pre-IIRIRA landscape is replete with 
references to this binary, as well as interchangeable uses of 
“admission” and “entry.”  See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. 
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (“It is important to note 
at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a 
distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores 
seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who are within 
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the United States” are properly treated as aliens “seeking initial 
admission” and that they therefore “cannot invoke the 
Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, in an effort to 
force judicial review beyond what Congress has already 
granted them.”  Id. at 445-46.  But our reasoning in Castro 
leads to the opposite conclusion here because, as SIJ designees, 
Petitioners are readily distinguished from aliens “‘on the 
threshold of entry’ who clearly lack constitutional due process 
protections concerning their application for admission.”  Id. at 
444 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).   
 
In Castro, we considered the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Landon that “once an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”  Id. at 
448 (quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added by 
Castro)).  And we also looked to United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), where the Court maintained 
that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have 
come within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country.”  Castro, 835 F.3d 
at 448 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (emphasis 
added by Castro)); see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 
U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (“The alien, to whom the United 
States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a 
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his 
identity with our society.” (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 
770-71)).  Noting these precedents and the Court’s consistent 
                                              
the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 
185, 187 (1958)). 
26 
 
emphasis on the relationship between alien and country, we 
concluded that—although physical presence in the country for 
any duration may be relevant—presence alone, particularly of 
short duration, cannot be sufficient to establish that an alien is 
entitled to constitutional protections, especially given 
“Congress’ and the Executive’s plenary power over decisions 
regarding the admission or exclusion of aliens”; consequently, 
we rejected the petitioners’ attempts to use constitutional 
protections to shield themselves from expedited removal.  See 
Castro, 835 F.3d at 448-50 & n.30. 
 
In contrast, Petitioners here have developed the 
“substantial connections with this country,” Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271, that “go with permanent residence,” 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.  That is because, as explained below, 
(1) these children have satisfied rigorous eligibility criteria for 
SIJ status, denoting them as wards of the state with obvious 
implications for their relationship to the United States; 
(2) Congress accorded these children a range of statutory and 
procedural protections that establish a substantial legal 
relationship with the United States; (3) with their eligibility for 
application for permanent residence assured and their 
applications awaiting only the availability of visas (a 
development that is imminent by the Government’s 
calculation) and the approval of the Attorney General, these 
children have more than “beg[un] to develop the ties that go 
with permanent residence,” Castro, 835 F.3d at 448 (quoting 
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32); and (4) in contrast with the 
circumstances in Castro, recognition of SIJ designees’ 
connection to the United States is consistent with the exercise 
of Congress’s plenary power. 
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1. Eligibility Criteria 
We begin with the requirements for SIJ status that 
“show a congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused 
children to remain safely in the country with a means to apply 
for LPR status,” Garcia v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th 
Cir. 2011), and that, in effect, establish a successful applicant 
as a ward of the United States with the approval of both state 
and federal authorities, see Yeboah, 345 F.3d at 221; 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
 
This understanding of SIJ status is reflected in the very 
definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile, i.e., a child “who 
has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the 
United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, 
or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a 
State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile 
court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 
1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, 
neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State 
law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).  It is also compelled not 
only by the statute’s purpose and history, see Yeboah, 345 F.3d 
at 221 (recognizing that Congress established SIJ status “to 
protect abused, neglected, or abandoned children who, with 
their families, illegally entered the United States”); see also 
Conference Report on H.R. 2267, Sec. 113, Congressional 
Record, House of Representatives, 143 Cong. Rec. H10809-01 
(November 13, 1997) (observing that the statutory language 
was modified “in order to limit the beneficiaries . . . to those 
juveniles for whom it was created, namely abandoned, 
neglected, or abused children”), but also by DHS’s own 
characterization of SIJ status as a “classification to provide 
humanitarian protection for abused, neglected, or abandoned 
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child immigrants eligible for long-term foster care,” 6 USCIS 
Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 1 (Mar. 21, 2018).  And the SIJ 
statute’s implementing regulations indicate that, to remain 
eligible for adjustment of status pending visa availability, SIJ 
designees must remain in the custody of the state court or state 
agency to which they have been committed.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11(c)(5) (noting that to be eligible for SIJ status, an alien 
must “continue[] to be dependent upon the juvenile court and 
eligible for long-term foster care” (emphasis added)); see also 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978-01, 
54980 (proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R pts. 
204-05, 245) (noting that “dependency,” for purposes of SIJ 
status, “encompasses dependency, commitment, or custody”).   
 
Importantly, that close, dependency relationship with 
the United States is also borne out by the statutory criteria for 
SIJ eligibility.  To qualify for SIJ status, applicants not only 
must be physically present in the United States, unmarried, and 
under the age of twenty-one, but also, before applying to 
USCIS, they must obtain an order of dependency from a state 
juvenile court.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.11(c).  That order requires the state court to find: (1) that 
the applicant is “dependent on a juvenile court . . . or placed 
under the custody” of a state agency or someone appointed by 
the state; (2) that “it would not be in the alien’s best interest to 
be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of 
nationality or . . . habitual residence,”; and (3) that 
“reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis 
found under State law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i), (ii); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a), (c).  Moreover, these determinations 
must be “in accordance with state law governing such 
declarations of dependency,” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(3), which, 
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depending on the state, may also entail specific residency 
requirements, e.g., Pa. R. Civ. P. § 1915.2(a)(ii) (providing that 
the dependency action must be brought in the child’s home 
county or a county “which had been the child’s home county 
within six months before commencement of the 
proceeding”). 12   Petitioners themselves had resided in 
Pennsylvania for more than six months before seeking their 
state court dependency declarations.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 64:6-
9 (“The reason that they got SIJ status, they had to be here for 
at least six months under Pennsylvania law to even go to seek 
a predicate order for SIJ status through the state courts.”).    
    
With that order in hand, applicants must then file an 
application with USCIS, along with “sufficient evidence to 
establish . . . eligibility” and the associated filing fee.  6 USCIS 
Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 4 (Mar. 21, 2018); see also USCIS, 
Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant 
(Form I-360), https://www.uscis.gov/i-360.  The Secretary of 
Homeland Security must also consent to the grant of SIJ status, 
which functions as “an acknowledgement that the request for 
                                              
12  Aside from residency, states impose a variety of 
requirements to establish dependency over and above those 
required by the terms of the SIJ statute, reinforcing that an 
order of dependency reflects an independent relationship 
between the SIJ applicant and the state.  See, e.g., In re Erick 
M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Neb. 2012) (requiring a showing 
that reunification with neither parent is feasible, rather than 
reunification with either parent, as the SIJ statute requires); 
O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244, 
1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (requiring a showing that the 
abuse was not “too remote in time”).  
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SIJ classification is bona fide”—that is, that the benefit is 
“‘sought primarily . . . for the purpose of obtaining relief from 
abuse or neglect or abandonment.’”  USCIS Memorandum 3 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-405, at 130); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). 
 
All of these requirements attest to SIJ designees’ 
dependency and close ties with state and federal authorities, the 
risk to their well-being in being removed to their countries of 
origin, and a relationship to the United States that far exceeds 
that of aliens “on the threshold of initial entry” or 
“apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the 
United States.”13  Castro, 835 F.3d at 444-45. 
 
                                              
13 This is not to suggest that aliens must be accorded a 
formal statutory designation and attendant benefits to lay claim 
to “substantial connections” to this country, or indeed, that an 
alien must have such connections to invoke the Suspension 
Clause.  See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of 
State, 251 F.3d 192, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (pointing out that 
Verdugo-Urquidez did not state that “only” individuals who 
have “substantial connections” are entitled to constitutional 
protections and, in concluding that the appellant had developed 
such connections, declining to undertake “as a general matter 
. . . how ‘substantial’ an alien’s connections with this country 
must be” to merit constitutional protections).  We need not 
address here what minimum requirements aliens must meet to 
lay claim to constitutional protections.  We hold merely that 
SIJ designation and the relationship to the United States to 
which it attests are more than sufficient.  
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2. Legal Relationship with the 
United States 
SIJ status also reflects the determination of Congress to 
accord those abused, neglected, and abandoned children a legal 
relationship with the United States and to ensure they are not 
stripped of the opportunity to retain and deepen that 
relationship without due process.  See Garcia, 659 F.3d at 1271 
(describing SIJ status as a “special recognition and opportunity 
to make contacts in this country”).   
 
That is, with the protections it afforded those with SIJ 
status, Congress provided opportunities for this class of aliens 
to strengthen their connections to the United States, pending a 
determination on their applications for adjustment of status.  
Not only are SIJ designees “deemed, for purposes of 
[adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 
§ 1255(a)], to have been paroled into the United States,”14 8 
                                              
14 Much ink has been spilled in this case over one of the 
underlying merits questions: whether “deemed, for purposes of 
[§ 1255(a)], to have been paroled,” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1), 
qualifies SIJ designees as “paroled” for any other purpose in 
the INA.  Specifically, Petitioners contend that because they 
are “deemed . . . paroled” by virtue of their SIJ status, they are 
now categorically exempt from expedited removal, which 
applies only to “aliens arriving in the United States . . . who 
have not been admitted or paroled.”  Id. § 1225(b)(1).  From 
this perspective, reading “deemed” to diminish the word it 
modifies would be inconsistent with its plain meaning of to 
“judge” or to “classify,” Deem, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 589 (1964), and with the use of the 
term elsewhere in the INA, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
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U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1), but Congress also enlarged the chance 
that Petitioners would be successful in their applications for 
                                              
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii); id. § 1226a(a)(7), and in case law, see, 
e.g., Centurion v. Holder, 755 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259, 267 (4th Cir. 2013); Joubert v. 
Barnhart, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2005).  The 
Government, on the other hand, emphasizes that § 1255(h)(1) 
accords parole “for purposes of [§ 1255(a)]” and argues that 
the District Court was correct to conclude being “deemed . . . 
paroled” is a “legal fiction created only to allow DHS to 
determine whether an alien is eligible for an immigrant visa 
under § 1255(a),” Gov’t Br. 24-25 (quoting Osorio-Martinez 
et al. v. Att’y Gen., No. 5:17-cv-01747, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 
23, 2017)).  From that perspective, Congress made a distinction 
between those “deemed, for purposes of [§ 1255(a)], to have 
been paroled” in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1) and those granted 
“parole” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(a), and, as the 
Government would have it, intended to exempt only the latter 
from expedited removal when it limited § 1225(b)(1) to those 
“not . . . admitted or paroled.”  The merits of these arguments, 
however, are not what we must resolve today:  For our 
purposes, even assuming that SIJ designees are deemed 
“paroled” for no other purpose than adjustment of status under 
§ 1255(a), Congress expressly exempted only SIJ designees 
and aliens who served honorably in active duty in the United 
States military from § 1255(a)’s general requirement that 
aliens be “admitted or paroled into the United States” before 
applying for adjustment of status, id. §§ 1255(h)(1), 1255(g)—
a significant benefit that supports the substantial legal 
relationship of SIJ designees with the United States and, hence, 
their ability to invoke the Suspension Clause and obtain 
judicial review.   
33 
 
adjustment by exempting them from a host of grounds that 
would otherwise render them inadmissible—including being 
found to be a “public charge,” lacking a “valid entry 
document,” or having “misrepresented a material fact”—while 
seeking admission into the United States, id. § 1182(a); see 
also id. § 1255(h)(2)(A).  Similarly, Congress conferred on SIJ 
designees a variety of other statutory benefits that deepen the 
ties of those permitted to remain in the United States while they 
await that adjustment of status, such as access to federally 
funded educational programming, see id. § 1232(d)(4)(A), and 
preferential status when seeking employment-based visas, see 
id. § 1153(b). 
 
In addition, Congress also afforded these aliens a host 
of procedural rights designed to sustain their relationship to the 
United States and to ensure they would not be stripped of SIJ 
protections without due process.  SIJ status may be revoked 
only for what the Secretary of Homeland Security deems “good 
and sufficient cause.”  8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2; see 
also 7 USCIS Policy Manual, pt. F, ch. 7 (Mar. 21, 2018).  
Even then, revocation must be “on notice,” meaning that the 
agency must provide the SIJ designee with “notice of intent” 
to revoke, an “opportunity to offer evidence . . . in opposition 
to the grounds alleged for revocation,” a “written notification 
of the decision that explains the specific reasons for the 
revocation,” and the option to file an appeal within the agency.  
8 C.F.R. § 205.2.  SIJ designees are also entitled to judicial 
review to the extent they challenge actions not “committed to 
agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), including the 
agency’s application of the SIJ criteria and compliance with 
specified procedures.  See Quarantillo, 301 F.3d at 111-14 
(judicial review available for denial of SIJ status based on 8 
C.F.R. § 204.11(c) factors); Yeboah, 345 F.3d at 220, 222 n.5 
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(same); Ghaly v. INS, 48 F.3d 1426, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(judicial review available for revocation of status under 8 
C.F.R. § 205.2); cf. Jilin Pharm., 447 F.3d at 200 (no judicial 
review for whether the Secretary of Homeland Security has 
found “what he deems to be good and sufficient cause” because 
it is committed to agency discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1155). 
 
Yet revocation of these statutory rights without cause, 
notice, or judicial review is precisely the consequence of 
expedited removal.  Despite their SIJ classification, the 
children, once removed, would be unable to adjust status 
because doing so requires physical presence within the United 
States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), and further, they would be 
barred from reentry for at least five years, see id. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i); 22 C.F.R. § 40.91(a). 15   Moreover, 
                                              
15  The Government points out that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) allows the Director of USCIS to waive 
Petitioners’ inadmissibility.  But this is a small comfort indeed, 
as the grant or denial of such a waiver is an unreviewable 
discretionary decision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), has no 
fixed timeline by which waiver applications must be processed, 
USCIS, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission 
Into the United States After Deportation or Removal (Form I-
212), https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/ 
admission-forms/form-i-212-application-permission-reapply-
admission-united-states-after (informing applicants that 
review of a request to waive inadmissibility “can take up to six 
months or longer”), costs applicants many hundreds of dollars 
in fees, USCIS, Instructions for Application for Permission to 
Re-apply for Admission Into the United States After 
Deportation or Removal (Form I-212), at 15, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-
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Petitioners’ expedited removal would be based on a ground for 
inadmissibility—lack of valid immigration documentation, see 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)—from which Petitioners are 
expressly exempted by virtue of their SIJ status, see id. 
§ 1255(h)(2)(A).  In short, expedited removal would render SIJ 
status a nullity.   
 
And beyond the direct repudiation of the statutory rights 
of SIJ designees, expedited removal would also implicate 
constitutional due process concerns.  In Yeboah we observed 
that in deciding whether to grant a juvenile alien consent to go 
before a state juvenile court for a dependency hearing, as 
required to obtain SIJ status, “[t]he INS Director’s discretion 
is bound only by due process considerations.”  345 F.3d at 223.  
We explained that, “[a]s a juvenile alien, [the petitioner] has 
the right to have his request for a dependency hearing 
considered in accordance with INS policy.”  Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 557 (6th Cir. 
1999) (SIJ status confers “a meaningful legal benefit”).  More 
generally, we recognized in Dia v. Ashcroft that “[t]he due 
process afforded aliens stems from those statutory rights 
granted by Congress and the principle that ‘[m]inimum due 
process rights attach to statutory rights.’”  353 F.3d 228, 239 
                                              
212instr.pdf (noting that filing fee for waiver of inadmissibility 
is $930), and even in the case of approval would still only result 
in relief after Petitioners waited in queue for available visas, 
which the Government informs us are currently backlogged by 
at least two years, Gov’t Br. 26.  And perhaps most 
importantly, there is no affirmative reason to believe such a 
waiver would be granted at all. 
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(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 
(3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
Moreover, while the creation of statutory rights 
associated with a given immigration status falls exclusively 
within the purview of Congress, it bears mention that the 
Executive to this point has consistently respected those rights 
and allowed SIJ designees to remain in the United States 
pending adjustment of status.  Although the INA allows the 
DHS to expeditiously remove certain aliens apprehended up to 
two years after entering the United States and who were 
encountered anywhere within United States territory, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), it apparently has not, until recently, 
sought even standard removal, much less expedited removal, 
of SIJ designees while their applications for adjustment of 
status were pending, App. 284. 16   To the contrary, under 
                                              
16  Notably, the agency has traditionally limited the 
application of expedited removal to aliens “encountered within 
14 days of entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of 
any U.S. international land border.”  Designating Aliens for 
Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01, 48879 (Aug. 11, 
2004).  The President has recently directed the Secretary of 
DHS to “take appropriate action to apply” expedited removal 
proceedings “to aliens designated under [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)],” Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017), and, while it appears that SIJ 
designees cannot lawfully be subjected to such proceedings in 
any event for the reasons we explain here, even if they could, 
the Secretary has not yet published any notice of a new policy.  
See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r of U.S. 
Customs and Border Prot. et al., Implementing the President’s 
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USCIS policy, if a “SIJ is in removal proceedings, the 
immigration court must terminate [removal] proceedings 
before USCIS can adjudicate the adjustment application.”  6 
USCIS Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 4 n.2 (Mar. 21, 2018).  
Similarly, the BIA has made clear its conclusion that even mere 
applicants for SIJ status—let alone children who have already 
received SIJ status—should not be removed from the country, 
as it has repeatedly held that “[a]bsent evidence of an alien’s 
ineligibility for SIJ status, an Immigration Judge should, as a 
general practice, continue proceedings to await adjudication of 
a pending state dependency petition,” In re Adelina Gonzalez-
Morales, A206 453 127, 2015 WL 4873234, at *1 (BIA July 
2, 2015); accord In re Johan Fuentes, A202 005 328, 2015 WL 
4510742, at *1 (BIA June 19, 2015); In re Maria Georgina 
Martinez-Mendoza, A206 732 194, 2015 WL 3896298, at *2 
(BIA June 1, 2015).  The Chief Immigration Judge has likewise 
instructed IJs that “if an unaccompanied child is applying for 
Special Immigrant Juvenile . . . status, the case must be 
administratively closed or reset for that process to occur in the 
appropriate state or juvenile court.” 17   Memorandum from 
                                              
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements 
Policies 7 (Feb. 20, 2017) (stating that DHS “will publish in 
the Federal Register a new Notice Designating Aliens Subject 
to Expedited Removal . . . , which may, to the extent I 
determine is appropriate, depart” from current limitations).  
 
17 We note that the Attorney General recently issued a 
decision instructing IJs and the BIA that cases should be 
“administratively closed” only where expressly authorized by 
regulation or judicially approved settlement and explaining 
that “[c]ases that should not go forward should be terminated 
(either with or without prejudice), or dismissed,” or upon a 
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Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Immigration 
Judges, Docketing Practices Relating to Unaccompanied 
Children Cases and Adults with Children Released on 
Alternatives to Detention Cases in Light of the New Priorities 
2 (Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter O’Leary Memorandum].   
 
In sum, because Petitioners enjoy at least “minimum 
due process rights” by virtue of their SIJ designation, this case 
stands in stark contrast to the key precedents we relied on in 
Castro—two Cold War-era decisions about aliens detained on 
Ellis Island at the threshold of entry—to conclude that aliens 
apprehended within hours of entering the country could not lay 
claim to constitutional rights and could not invoke the 
Suspension Clause.  835 F.3d at 444, 447-48 (citing Knauff, 
338 U.S. at 544, and Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212).  Instead, the facts 
before us more resemble those in Khouzam v. Attorney 
General, where we held that neither Mezei nor Knauff was 
applicable for purposes of determining whether an alien 
“detained immediately upon arrival without proper 
documentation” was entitled to due process because the alien 
“ha[d] already been granted statutory relief from removal.”  
549 F.3d 235, 256 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).  Here, 
likewise, the children’s statutory rights and attendant 
constitutional rights as SIJ designees bespeak a substantial 
legal relationship between them and the United States—a 
                                              
showing of good cause, handled by way of “continuance[] . . . 
for a fixed but potentially renewable period of time.”  Matter 
of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 291 (Att’y Gen. 2018) 
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29).  
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relationship far more significant than what we considered upon 
the petitioners’ initial entry in Castro.18 
 
3. Relationship to Lawful 
Permanent Resident Status 
Because of the rights and benefits they have been 
accorded, SIJ designees stand much closer to lawful permanent 
residents than to aliens present in the United States for a few 
hours before their apprehension.  Indeed, Petitioners are a 
hair’s breadth from being able to adjust their status, pending 
only the availability of immigrant visas and the approval of the 
                                              
18 We do not suggest that habeas relief is contingent on 
a prior determination of the due process rights of a detainee.  
See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause 
After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 574 
(2010) (noting that in Boumediene, “the Supreme Court found 
that the Guantanamo detainees were protected by the 
Suspension Clause without first inquiring whether they had 
rights under the Due Process Clause”).  Nor must we precisely 
ascertain the extent or nature of Petitioners’ statutory or due 
process rights and the relationship between these rights and the 
Suspension Clause.  See Martin H. Redish & Colleen 
McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension 
Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American 
Constitutionalism, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1364 (2010) (“[T]he 
relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses 
remains completely unsettled.”).  While aliens who lack 
constitutional rights of any kind are precluded from invoking 
the Suspension Clause, those who enjoy the statutory and due 
process rights that accompany SIJ status are not.   
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Attorney General.19  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  This proximity 
to LPR status is significant because the lawful permanent 
resident is the quintessential example of an alien entitled to 
“broad constitutional protections.”  Castro, 835 F.3d at 447; 
see also Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596 (“[A] lawful 
permanent resident of the United States . . . physically present 
there . . . may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property 
without due process of law.”).  And once immigrant visas 
become available and Petitioners attain LPR status, there is no 
question that they would be excepted from the INA’s 
jurisdiction-stripping provision, such that any attempt to 
enforce removal orders previously issued against them would 
be subject to our review.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)(C) (allowing 
judicial review as to whether the petitioner is “an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence”); see also Memorandum 
from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, USCIS, to 
Regional and District Directors, Memorandum #3 – Field 
Guidance on Special Juvenile Status Petitions 2 (May 27, 
2004) (“Juveniles who adjust status as a result of an SIJ 
classification enjoy all benefits of lawful permanent 
residence.” (emphasis added)).   
 
To emphasize what it perceives as the gulf between a 
lawful permanent resident and a SIJ designee, the Government 
makes much of the fact that adjustment of status is a 
discretionary determination, to which aliens are not entitled 
merely by virtue of having obtained SIJ status or having filed 
an adjustment application.  In a similar vein, the Government 
stresses that an alien who obtained SIJ classification may still 
                                              
19 Although adjustment of status may be denied at the 
discretion of the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), the 
Government has given no indication that would occur here. 
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be inadmissible.  But for purposes of determining whether an 
alien may lay claim to any constitutional protections regarding 
their application for admission, these points are neither here 
nor there.  Nothing in our precedent suggests that the lack of 
lawful permanent resident status, potential inadmissibility, or 
the happenstance that visas are not currently available is 
dispositive in assessing an alien’s entitlement to habeas review.  
On the contrary, an undocumented alien who has continuously 
lived in the country for “several years” is obviously not a 
lawful resident and is potentially inadmissible, yet in Castro 
we pointed out such an alien “could very well” succeed in a 
constitutional attack on § 1252(e)(2).  835 F.3d at 433 n.13.   
 
Here, Petitioners have exercised the rights accorded 
them as SIJ designees and have had their LPR applications 
pending for close to two years. 20   Assuming, as the 
Government asserted at the time of briefing, that the waiting 
list was then about two years long, Petitioners’ receipt of visas 
is imminent.  We consider these circumstances, including 
Petitioners’ proximity to LPR status with its even fuller range 
of rights, as further evidence of their meaningful and 
substantial connection with the United States. 
                                              
20 Although not the basis for our decision today, we note 
that Petitioners have lived in the United States during this 
period and at least some of that time has been outside of 
detention in local communities.  See supra note 5.  In Castro 
we explained that “physical presence is a factor courts should 
consider” in assessing an alien’s constitutional rights, even 
though in the case of an alien apprehended immediately upon 
entering the country it may not be sufficient in establishing 
such rights.  835 F.3d at 448 n.30.   
 
42 
 
4. The Plenary Power Doctrine 
 In Castro, where the petitioners were “on the threshold 
of initial entry” and had no connection to the United States, we 
held that deference to “Congress’ and the Executive’s plenary 
power over decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of 
aliens” compelled a judgment for the Government.  Castro, 
835 F.3d at 450.  As we observed, “the power to expel or 
exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised 
by the Government’s political departments largely immune 
from judicial control,” id. at 439 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 
U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).  But we also recognized that, while the 
political branches’ plenary power over immigration is “by no 
means . . . subject to judicial review in all contexts,” it is 
“certain[ly]” subject to judicial review in some contexts 
because that power “is [not] limitless in all respects.”  Id. at 
449 n.32.  Rather, the plenary power “is subject to important 
constitutional limitations,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695, and it is 
the province of the courts to decide “whether Congress has 
chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing 
that power,” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983).   
 
With those limitations in mind, we were careful in 
Castro to distinguish “aliens seeking initial admission to the 
country” for whom Congress, in the exercise of its plenary 
power, had foreclosed any claim to constitutional protection, 
835 F.3d at 449 & n.32, and aliens who had developed 
“substantial connections with this country” and therefore did 
“receive constitutional protections,” including the right to 
invoke habeas review under the Suspension Clause, id. at 448 
(quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271) (emphasis 
omitted).   
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In contrast to the petitioners in Castro, Petitioners in 
this case fall squarely in the second category.  As SIJ 
designees, Petitioners have satisfied the SIJ eligibility criteria, 
have been declared dependents of the State, have been 
accorded an array of significant statutory rights and procedural 
protections by Congress, have been “deemed paroled into the 
United States” for purposes of adjustment of status, and are 
eligible for that adjustment of status as soon as visas become 
available off the wait list.  See supra Section III.B.i.1-3.  In 
these circumstances, the plenary power of the political 
departments does not preclude invocation of the Suspension 
Clause.  See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 
941; Castro, 835 F.3d at 448.  Indeed, if anything, it cuts the 
other way: the rights and safeguards that Congress has 
legislated for SIJ designees could be duly considered in 
standard removal proceedings, but they would be eviscerated 
by the expedited removal now sought by the Attorney General.  
See supra Section III.B.i.2.  Insulating expedited orders from 
judicial review thus hardly accords respect to Congress’s wide-
ranging authority in the immigration realm.21   
                                              
21  Nor, to the extent our respect for the political 
branches’ power over immigration policy extends to the 
Executive, does the Attorney General’s decision here to 
proceed with expedited removal give rise to a concern under 
the plenary power doctrine.  Tellingly, before this point, the 
Executive itself had consistently acknowledged the special 
relationship of SIJ designees to the United States, by 
instructing IJs that they “must terminate [removal] proceedings 
before USCIS can adjudicate the adjustment application” of 
SIJ applicants, 6 USCIS Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 4 n.2 (Mar. 
21, 2018), and that removal cases of children applying for SIJ 
status “must be administratively closed or reset for that process 
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Instead, we recognize that the power to expel, exclude, 
or deny lawful immigration status to aliens necessarily 
encompasses the power to decline to do any of these.  Thus, 
while it remains true that “[o]ver no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the 
admission of aliens,” Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 
(1972) (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 
547 (1895) (Harlan, J.)), that plenary power has been 
marshalled here to protect Petitioners, not to deprive them of 
process, and Petitioners therefore do not seek “to force judicial 
review beyond what Congress has already granted them,” 
Castro, 835 F.3d at 446, but rather to enforce the very rights 
and review that Congress did grant.   
 
                                              
to occur in the appropriate state or juvenile court,” O’Leary 
Memorandum 2.  Cf. supra note 17.  Of course, where 
Congress has committed immigration decisions to the 
discretion of the Attorney General, “[j]udicial deference” to an 
exercise of that discretion “is of special importance.”  Negusie 
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009).  But where, as here, 
Petitioners claim the Attorney General is now contravening 
Congress’s mandate, they challenge “the extent of the Attorney 
General’s authority under the [INA]” and “the extent of that 
authority is not a matter of discretion.”  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 
688.  Instead, the Attorney General must respect that the 
“formulation of [immigration] policies is entrusted exclusively 
to Congress,” and “[i]n the enforcement of these policies, the 
Executive Branch of the Government must respect the 
procedural safeguards of due process.”  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972). 
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For these reasons, Petitioners may not be denied the 
privilege of habeas corpus, and we proceed to the next step of 
our inquiry. 
 
ii. Boumediene Step Two 
At the second step of the Boumediene analysis, we 
determine “whether the statute stripping jurisdiction . . . has 
provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus,” 
for if it does there is no violation of the Suspension Clause.  
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.  As we will explain, however, 
here the statute does not provide “an ‘adequate and effective’ 
alternative to habeas review.”  Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 246 
(quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)). 
 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court took care to explain 
that habeas review is “most pressing” in the case of executive 
detention, as opposed to where “relief is sought from a 
sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of record.”  
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782-83.  For the writ to be effective 
in such a case, “[t]he habeas court must have sufficient 
authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for 
detention and the Executive’s power to detain.”  Id. at 783; see 
also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical 
core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 
reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that 
context that its protections have been strongest.”).  More 
specifically, the Court declared it “uncontroversial . . . that the 
privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful 
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 
‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant 
law.”  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
at 302). 
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But the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not 
provide even this “uncontroversial” baseline of review.  
Instead, § 1252(e)(2) permits habeas review of expedited 
removal orders as to only three exceptionally narrow issues:  
whether the petitioner (1) is an alien, (2) was “ordered 
removed” (which we have interpreted to mean only “whether 
an immigration officer issued that piece of paper [the removal 
order] and whether the Petitioner is the same person referred to 
in that order,” Castro, 835 F.3d at 431 (internal citation 
omitted)), and (3) can prove his or her lawful status in the 
country.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).  It also explicitly precludes 
review of “whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled 
to any relief from removal,” id. § 1252(e)(5), and of “any other 
cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation 
or operation of” the removal order, id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i).  
Together, these provisions prevent us from considering 
“whether the expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to 
petitioners,” Castro, 835 F.3d at 432 (quoting Am.-Arab, 272 
F. Supp. 2d at 663), and thus preclude review of “the erroneous 
application or interpretation of relevant law,” Boumediene, 553 
U.S. at 779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302).  That, however, 
is the “uncontroversial” minimum demanded by the Great 
Writ.22  Id.   
                                              
22  Given the starkness of the jurisdiction-stripping 
statute’s deficiency, we need not engage in an extended inquiry 
here.  We note, however, that even if it were a closer question, 
other guidance in Boumediene would lead us to the same result.  
As discussed by the Second Circuit in Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 
85, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2011), where it considered whether statutory 
motions to reopen—a process that allows Circuit Courts to 
engage in de novo review of “questions of law and 
constitutional claims”—constituted an acceptable substitute 
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Because we conclude both that Petitioners may invoke 
the privilege of habeas corpus and that the INA does not 
provide “adequate substitute procedures” in its absence, 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771, we hold that § 1252(e) violates 
the Suspension Clause as applied to Petitioners and that the 
District Court therefore retains jurisdiction to consider 
Petitioners’ claims on remand. 
 
C. Temporary Injunctive Relief 
 As a final matter, we consider the implications of our 
holding for the District Court’s dissolution of the temporary 
restraining order and denial of injunctive relief pending 
resolution of Petitioners’ complaint.  The District Court 
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus 
and enjoin Petitioners’ removal or to order them placed in 
standard removal proceedings, reasoning that Petitioners could 
not satisfy the standard for injunctive relief absent subject-
matter jurisdiction.   
 
                                              
for habeas review, Boumediene counsels us to ask whether “the 
purpose and effect of the [substitute] was to expedite 
consideration of the [detainee’s] claims, not to delay or 
frustrate it,” whether “the scope of the substitute procedure . . . 
[is] ‘subject to manipulation’ by the Government,” whether the 
“mechanism for review . . . ‘is wholly a discretionary one,’” 
and whether “the entity substituting for a habeas court . . . 
‘[has] adequate authority . . . to formulate and issue appropriate 
orders for relief.’”  Luna, 637 F.3d at 97 (quoting Boumediene, 
553 U.S. at 775-91).  For the reasons we have explained, here, 
as in Luna, those considerations also favor Petitioners. 
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To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party 
must show: (1) a likelihood of “succe[ss] on the merits,” (2) a 
likelihood that the moving party will “suffer irreparable harm,” 
(3) that the “balance of equities” weighs in the moving party’s 
favor, and (4) that injunctive relief is in “the public interest.”  
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  
If the moving party has established the first two “most critical” 
factors, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), the district 
court then performs a “balancing of the factors” Reilly v. City 
of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 180 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017), to 
determine whether the prongs, “taken together, balance in 
favor of granting the requested preliminary relief,” id. at 179.  
Where the Government is the non-moving party in the 
immigration context, the third and fourth factors generally 
“merge” into one.  Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.   
 
Considering these factors here, we conclude the District 
Court erred in dissolving the TRO and denying Petitioners’ 
motion for injunctive relief.23  The first factor, likelihood of 
success on the merits of their underlying habeas petition, is 
easily established given the incompatibility of expedited orders 
                                              
23 We exercise our discretion in this circumstance to 
address the District Court’s rulings on the merits, rather than 
remand for the District Court to reconsider injunctive relief in 
light of this opinion.  Although we recognize that the Court 
diligently sought to comport its rulings with Castro and did not 
have the benefit of our holding today, there is no need to 
remand where, as here, “the outcome is clear as a matter of 
law,” Blackledge v. Blackledge, 866 F.3d 169, 182 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citations omitted), and the interest of judicial economy 
counsels against doing so, Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 
F.3d 129, 149 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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of removal with the statutory and constitutional rights of SIJ 
designees.  Congress granted SIJ designees a clear set of rights, 
including eligibility to apply for adjustment to LPR status, 
protection against having their SIJ status revoked without 
statutorily prescribed process, and the due process rights that 
automatically attach to statutory rights.  See supra Section 
III.B.i.1-2.  Yet each of these rights and protections would be 
summarily stripped from Petitioners upon execution of the 
expedited orders of removal against them. 
 
  The second factor, irreparable harm, is also satisfied 
given the finding in this case by a juvenile court “that 
reunification with one or more of the child’s parents was not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and that it would 
not be in the child’s best interest to be returned to his or her 
country of origin.”  App. 7-8.  This conclusion is also bolstered 
by the drastic legal consequences that expedited removal 
would carry for Petitioners’ pending applications for 
adjustment of status and future admissibility.  See supra 
Section III.B.i.2. 
 
 The third and fourth factors also weigh in favor of 
Petitioners.  We are aware of the “public interest in prompt 
execution of removal orders” and the Supreme Court’s 
admonition against characterizing the Government harm in 
removal cases as “nothing more than one alien being permitted 
to remain while an appeal is decided.”  Nken, 556 U.S. at 435-
36 (citation omitted).  But the fact that the Government has 
not—until now—sought to remove SIJ applicants, much less 
designees, undermines any urgency surrounding Petitioners’ 
removal.  Instead, by approving Petitioners’ SIJ applications, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security “acknowledge[d] . . . that 
the SIJ benefit was . . . sought . . . for the purpose of obtaining 
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relief from abuse or neglect or abandonment” in the countries 
to which Petitioners would be removed.  USCIS Memorandum 
3.  And it is squarely in the public interest to enable individuals 
to partake of statutory and constitutional rights and meaningful 
judicial review where, as here, it is consistent with the process 
prescribed by Congress.  See California ex rel. Van De Kamp 
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (9th 
Cir. 1985), amended 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming 
injunction and allowing party to proceed without posting bond 
where doing so “would effectively deny access to judicial 
review”). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of Petitioners’ request for injunctive relief and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.24 
                                              
24 While the relief we grant today is limited to minor 
Petitioners, we note that in releasing one of the Petitioners and 
his mother and observing that the record was “completely 
devoid of any reason, rational or otherwise,” justifying their 
continued detention for almost two years, Petitioners’ 28(j) 
Letter 11, 25, 38, 47 (Sept. 14, 2017) (IJs Bond Memoranda), 
the IJ pointed to his power to parole the mother under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1236.3(b)(2) to ensure the child’s “psychological well-
being,” id. at 2, as well as to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(3)(ii), which 
provides that if a detained child cannot be released into the 
custody of a non-detained relative, the child “may be released 
with an accompanying relative who is in detention.” 
